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Abstract
This paper examines the presence of a political cycle in Australian monthly stock returns from January 1901 to
December 2005. The period selected includes fifty-nine Liberal-National (or their antecedents) and Labor
ministries and forty-seven elections. The political cycle is defined in terms of the party or coalition in power,
ministerial tenure and election information effects. The market variables are defined in terms of returns, excess
returns over inflation and excess returns over interest rates. Descriptive analysis indicates that mean returns and
excess returns over inflation are nearly 85 percent higher and excess returns over interest rates 193 percent
higher under Liberal-National ministries. Put differently, the market premium for Liberal-National ministries
averages between 3.2 and 5.2 percent over comparable Labor ministries. Returns under Labor ministries are also
characterised by extremely volatile, negatively skewed values. But after time-variation in risk is taken into
account with a GARCH-M specification, while returns and excess returns over inflation are higher under
Liberal-National ministries, there is no significant variation in excess returns over interest rates between
governments. This suggests most of the variation in political risk is reflected in interest rates.
JEL classification: G14; C12
Keywords: presidential puzzle; political cycle; returns and excess returns; elections

1. Introduction
Anecdotal evidence abounds of the link between securities markets and politics. In the
financial media, most economic and social policy is scrutinised concerning possible market
reactions, while industry and consumer groups comment on anticipated and hoped for
changes in policy. At election time, politicians are frequently accused of pork-barrelling, with
firms and investors alike anticipating the heady mix of tax breaks, consumption and
production subsidies, and fiscal and monetary stimulation that accompanies changes in the
political party in power. At the same time, parties are routinely pigeon-holed as pro- or antibusiness and pro- or anti-investor, reflected in some way in the flow and source of political
donations.
At least three empirical questions arise from such observations. First, does market
behaviour differ when governments are drawn from different political parties? That is, is
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stated ideology reflected in actual policy, and does this systematically vary in its influence on
market participants. Second, is this political influence constant or changing with the ebb and
flow of mandated terms in office and efforts to secure re-election? Put differently, is ideology
of any form implemented in a different way in business and investor policy at the beginning
of terms of an office that at the end? Finally, if the differences in markets are taken as given,
do markets react suddenly with the announcement of elections results, or are expectations
developed more gradually with the benefit of political comment and opinion polls?
The purpose of this paper is to add to this intriguing body of work the results of an analysis
of the Australian federal political cycle and its impact on the Australian equity market. To the
author’s knowledge this is the first work of its kind in Australia. The paper itself is divided
into five main areas. Section 2 briefly reviews the relevant literature. Section 3 provides a
snapshot of Australian political history. Section 4 explains the data collection employed in the
analysis and presents the empirical methodology. Section 5 presents the results. The paper
ends with a brief conclusion.

2. Literature review
The analysis of political cycles in stock market returns has been almost exclusively conducted
in the United States, and therein the context of presidential elections. Part is generic, to the
extent that institutional rigidities in the political cycle – mandated terms in office for example
– impose structure upon market returns. Herbst and Slinkman (1984), for example, examined
the period from 1926 to 1977 and found a 48-month cycle during which returns were higher
than average, peaking in November during presidential elections. Likewise, Huang (1985)
used data from 1832 to 1979 and discovered that stock returns were systematically higher in
the last half of a political term than in the first, as did Hensel and Ziemba (1995), though with
small and large-caps only. On this basis, Hensel and Ziemba (1995) suggested that “…these
findings are consistent with the hypothesis that political re-election campaigns create policies
that stimulate the economy and are positive for stock returns”.
But the larger part of this research focuses on differences in political ideology and the
differential impact of the political cycle on stock returns. Herein the focus of interest is on the
apparent preference of the market for right-of-centre presidents (i.e. Republicans).
Niederhoffer et al. (1970), for instance, showed that US stock market movements around
election dates were consistent with a pro-Republican bias on Wall Street, though evidence
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was not forthcoming on any longer-term relationship between Republican presidents and
stock returns. Similarly, Riley and Luksetich (1980) concluded that the market prefers
Republicans, and the market tends to rise following presidential elections. Dobson and
Dufrene (1993) extended this analysis outside of the United States, concluding that in equity
market terms US presidential elections invoke significant structural changes, with
international markets becoming more highly correlated. Other studies concerning the posited
positive market effect of Republican presidencies have been undertaken by Allvine and
O’Neil (1980), Hobbs and Riley (1984), Foerster and Schmitz (1997), Johnson and
Chittenden (1999), Booth and Booth (2003) and Bohl and Gottschalk (2005), while Nordhaus
(1975), MacCrae (1977), McCallum (1978), Hibbs (1977), Beck (1982a; 1982b), Havrilesky
(1987), Alesina and Sachs (1988) and Haynes (1989) address politico-business cycles more
broadly.
Most recently, Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) have re-examined the ‘presidential
puzzle’ sometimes arising in this research: that is, real returns are higher under Democratic
presidents, contradicting the conventional wisdom that Republicans are good for markets in a
manner unexplained by considerations of risk. Using data since 1927, Santa-Clara and
Valkanov (2003) found average excess returns for value-weighted market indexes over threemonth Treasury bills of about 2 percent under Republicans and 11 percent under Democrats.
Further, a decomposition of returns revealed that the difference was due to real market returns
being 5 percent higher under Democrats and real interest rates almost 4 percent lower.
Responding to the question of whether the difference in average returns was due to a
difference in expected (a Democratic risk premium) or unexpected (surprises in the economic
policies of the party in the presidency) returns, Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) concluded
that presidential parties capture variations in returns that are largely uncorrelated to what is
explained by business cycle fluctuations, and hence must be associated with systematic
differences in political policies.
Outside of the United States, the United Kingdom and New Zealand are the only other
national contexts known for the analysis of political cycles in stock returns. The UZ and New
Zealand are interesting in that while these have a two-party system in common with the
United States (Labour and Conservative, Labour and Nationals, respectively), unlike the
United States, the prime minister (as leader of the Executive) always controls the dominant
party in the elected house (House of Commons, House of Representatives, respectively). For
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this reason, as in Australia, there is a clearer connection between the political ideology of the
elected party and the implementation of economic and social policy. In New Zealand, Cahan
et al. (2005) concluded that the presidential puzzle was reversed, and that New Zealand
market returns were lower under left-leaning Labour governments than under National party
governments. This lay at odds with parallel analysis that suggested that market risk was
actually higher under the former.
In the United Kingdom, Manning (1989) showed that British Telecom shares, though not
the market as a whole, reacted to opinion polls surrounding the 1987 General Election in the
face of impending nationalisation, while Peel and Pope (1983), Gwilym and Buckle (1984)
and Thompson and Ioannidis (1987) examined the connection between the stock market and
business support for Tory (Conservative) governments. But most recently, Hudson et al.
(1998) found that while short-term price movements reacted to opinion polls in the run-up to
and including elections, there was no statistically significant evidence of a difference in
nominal or real returns between Tory and Labour governments.

3. A snapshot of Australian political history
Two groups conventionally dominate the Australian political spectrum at the federal level.
The first is a conservative coalition of parties made up of the Liberal Party and the Nationals
(including the Country Liberal Party). Collectively, these are known as the Coalition. The
second comprises a single social democratic party, the Australian Labor Party. There have
been fifty-nine ministries since Federation in 1901, with the Coalition and its antecedents
accounting for thirty-eight (64 percent) and the Labor Party twenty-one (36 percent).
Originally formed by the merger of the Protectionist and Free Trade parties in 1910, the
Liberal Party has undergone several reformations – including as the Nationalist Party in the
late 1910s and 1920s and the United Australian Party in the 1930s and early 1940s –
culminating in its present-day incarnation founded by Sir Robert Menzies in 1944. The
Liberal Party is regarded as a centre-right party and broadly represents the interests of
business, the suburban middle classes and urbanised regions. Since the October 2004 election,
the Liberals account for seventy-four of the one hundred and fifty House of Representatives
seats (47 percent), and from July 2005, thirty-two of the seventy-six seats in the Senate (42
percent). For the purposes of this analysis, the Liberal Party’s antecedents, including the
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Protectionist, Free Trade, Tariff Reform, Nationalist Labour, Nationalist and United Australia
parties, are viewed as ideologically similar.
The Nationals are a conservative party that traditionally represent rural and regional
interests. Originally known as the Country Party, and later the National Party of Australia, it
has held seats in the federal parliament since 1919. While the party has witnessed the steady
erosion of its rural support base in recent years, it still holds the balance of power for the
Coalition with twelve seats in the House of Representatives (16 percent) and six in the Senate
(8 percent). It is joined by the Country Liberal Party, which is the representative of both
parties in the Northern Territory, holding a single seat in both the House of Representatives
and the Senate.
The opposing party active at the federal level is the Australian Labor Party, a centre-left
party founded by the trade union movement in 1890 [by providing for the direct affiliation of
trade unions, the Australian Labor Party is more like labour parties in the UK and New
Zealand, and less like progressive parties such as the Democrats in the United States (ALP
2006)]. Historically, support for either the Coalition or the Labor Party was viewed as class
based, with the middle class supporting the Coalition and the working class supporting Labor.
In recent years, this has been a less important factor: in the 1970s and 1980s Labor gained a
significant bloc of middle class support and the Coalition enjoyed some working class
support. Indeed, part of the current electoral success of the Coalition is attributed to its appeal
to disaffected working class Labor voters. The Labor Party has endured a number of
debilitating splits in its long history, most notably with Prime Minister Billy Hughes and the
conscription debate during WWI leading to the creation of Nationalist Labor in 1917, and the
formation of the anti-communist Democratic Labor Party in 1955. The ALP currently
accounts for sixty seats in the House of Representatives (40 percent) and twenty-eight in the
Senate (37 percent).
Parties other than these have enjoyed limited success in Australia. These currently include
the Australian Greens, a left-wing environmental party, and the Australian Democrats,
middle-class centrists – both with four seats in the Senate – and Family First, a Christianinfluenced party appealing to social conservatives with a single Senate seat. In the past, the
minor parties have also included the centrist Democratic Labor Party from the mid-1950s
until the mid-1970s and the rightist One Nation party during the 1990s. The proportional
representation system often allows minor parties to win seats in the Senate and, on occasion,
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the balance of power in the upper house, but they have usually been unable to win seats in the
House of Representatives (lower house) given its electorate-based preferential voting system,
along with the nationwide dominance and broad-based appeal of the Coalition and Labor
parties.

4. Empirical methodology
4.1 Data and variable specification
Table 1 provides details of the fifty-nine Australian federal ministries since Federation on 1
January 1901 [Federation refers to the process whereby the six self-governing colonies of
New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia and Tasmania
joined together in a federal system of government]. All information is drawn from the
Australian Electoral Commission (2006a; 2006b). The duration of these ministries ranges
from less than one month to eighty-two months, with the Australian Labor Party (ALP)
accounting for 21 ministries across 389 months and the Liberal-National coalition and its
antecedents for 38 ministries over 869 months. The starting and ending months of each
ministerial term and the dates of the federal elections are also provided in Table 1.
The information in Table 1 is used to define the political cycle variables in this analysis.
The four political cycle variables are as follows. To start with, two dummy variables are
specified that take a value of one for months the Coalition is in power and zero otherwise (Ct),
while the second takes a value of one if the Labor Party is in power and zero otherwise (Lt).
The next two political variables are included to take account of whether the return on equities
varies across the term in office. Rather than using dummy variables to identify whether a day
falls in, say, the first or second half of the period in office as in Hudson et al. (1998), a
continuous variable (Tt) is specified as a simple linear trend taking a value of one on the first
month in office, two on the second month, and so on. This variable is reset at the beginning of
the next ministries’ term in office. An additional dummy variable is included which takes a
value of one for months that include an election and zero otherwise (Et).
The market data employed in the study are end-of-month closing prices from the
Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) and its predecessors over the period January 1901 to
December 2005. This sample encompasses 1,258 months and represents the complete period
since Federation for which monthly data is available [daily data from the ASX is also
available, but only since 1958]. The capitalization-weighted All Ordinaries Price Index is
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used. Currently, the index includes the top ASX-listed stocks by capitalization, covering
about 92 percent of domestic companies by market value. To be included in the index, stocks
must have an aggregate market value of at least 0.02 percent of all domestic equities, and
maintain an average turnover in excess of 0.5 percent of quoted shares each month. The longterm index includes base recalculations by Global Financial Data (2006).
A series of monthly market returns are first calculated where Rt = 100 ln(Pt Pt −1 ) where Pt
is the index level at the end of month t. The market index and monthly returns for the sample
period are presented in Figure 1 and Table 1 includes the mean return by ministry. Two
measures of excess return are also calculated. The first represents the difference between the
monthly market return and the monthly inflation rate as represented by the Australian
consumer price index (Rt-It). The second is the difference between the monthly market return
and the monthly yield on an Australian three-month Treasury bill (Rt-Yt) [Australian threemonth Treasury bills have only been issued since July 1928]. Both long-term series on
inflation and interest rates are obtained from Global Financial Data (2006). The mean
monthly excess return over inflation and excess return over interest by ministry are included
in Table 1.
4.2 Descriptive analysis
Figure 2 plots the mean monthly return by ministry. As shown, mean monthly returns
(ministry in brackets) are highest during Holt (35), Hawke (50) and Fraser (44) and lowest
during Page (19), Whitlam (42) and Fraser (47). The mean returns in Table 1 range between 2.35 and 4.75 percent. There is a similar ranking and range between returns and excess returns
over inflation. Excess returns over interest rates, however, range between -3.23 and 4.12
percent with the lowest mean excess returns during Fraser (47), Whitlam (42) and Page (19)
and the highest during Fadden (23), Holt (35) and Fraser (44).
Table 2 includes descriptive statistics by Liberal-National and Australian Labor Party for
returns, excess returns over inflation and excess returns over interest rates. As shown, mean
returns are higher for Liberal-National (0.5743) than Labor (0.3121), as are excess returns
over inflation (0.5712 and 0.3080) and excess returns over interest rates (0.2075 and -0.2222).
However, the volatility of returns (as measured by standard deviation) is higher for the Labor
Party than Liberal-National (5.2298 and 3.2828 for returns, 5.2300 and 3.2830 for excess
returns over inflation and 5.7046 and 3.7340 for excess returns over interest rates). This
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would indicate that all three measures of market return are lower and more uncertain under
Labor ministries than Liberal-National ministries. Tests for equality of means and variances
fail to reject the null hypothesis of equality of means for Liberal-National and Labor
governments, but do reject the null hypotheses for the equality of variances.
By and large, the distributional properties of the nominal returns series during ministries
also appear non-normal. Given that the sampling distribution of skewness is normal with
mean 0 and standard deviation of

6 T where T is the sample size, then returns (-2.1009),

excess returns over inflation (-2.1015) and excess returns over interest (-2.2378) are
significantly negatively skewed. Interestingly, the degree of skewness for Liberal-National
ministries is always significantly less than that for Labor ministries. The kurtosis or degree of
excess across all returns is mostly large, indicating leptokurtic distributions with many
extreme observations for returns (29.5504), excess returns over inflation (29.5526) and excess
returns over interest (30.2093). Given the sampling distribution of kurtosis is normal with
mean 0 and standard deviation of

24 T where T is the sample size, then all estimates are

once again statistically significant at any conventional level. However, once again the degree
of kurtosis for Liberal-National ministries is always less than during Labor ministries.
Clearly, returns during Labor ministries are characterised by more volatile, extreme and
negative values than comparable Liberal-National ministries. Finally, the Jarque-Bera
statistics reject the null hypotheses of normality at the .01 level for all series.
4.3 Model specification
The descriptive analysis of Australian market returns is suggestive of non-normality and
ARCH behaviour. A formal Lagrange multiplier test is applied and the results presented in
Table 3. As shown, the models fail to reject the null hypothesis of no ARCH errors in favour
of the alternative that the conditional error variance is given by an ARCH process. These
distributional properties indicate that generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedastistic
(GARCH) models can be used to examine the dynamics of the return generation process.
Autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) models and generalised ARCH
(GARCH) models that take into account the time-varying variances of time series data have
already been widely employed.
The specific GARCH(p,q)-M model used is considered appropriate for several reasons.
First, the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) and the arbitrage pricing theory (APT) establish
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the well-known (positive) relationship between asset risk and return. At a theoretical level,
asset risk in both CAPM and APT is measured by the conditional covariance of returns with
the market or the conditional variance of returns. ARCH models are specifically designed to
model and forecast conditional variances and by allowing risk to vary over time provide more
efficient estimators and more accurate forecasts of returns than those conventionally used to
model conditional means.
Second, an approach incorporating GARCH(p,q) can quantify both long and short-term
memory in returns. While ARCH allows for a limited number of lags in deriving the
conditional variance, and as such is considered to be a short-term memory model, GARCH
allows all lags to exert an influence and thereby constitutes a longer-term memory model.
This reflects an important and well-founded characteristic of asset returns in the tendency for
volatility clustering to be found, such that large changes in returns are often followed by other
large changes, and small changes in returns are often followed by yet more small changes.
The implication of such volatility clustering is that volatility shocks today will influence the
expectation of volatility many periods in the future and GARCH(p,q) measures this degree of
continuity or persistence in volatility.
Such model assumptions are generally consistent with Australian market behaviour.
Certainly investors are not indifferent to the volatility of the investments they hold - as
uncertainty in return varies, so does the risk premium required by investors. In addition, these
assumptions directly link the volatility clustering observed in markets with two pertinent
explanations. To start with, the irregular news arrival process can at least, in part, explain
volatility clustering, even when the market incorporates such information perfectly and
immediately. At the macro level nominal interest rates, business cycles, industrial production
and other indicators have already been proposed as sources of this clustering. However, it is
also the case that if market participants have heterogenous beliefs and there are lags in the
absorption of information, volatility clustering may also occur. This appears especially likely
in political markets since they are conventionally regarded as being less homogenous and
informationally efficient than their financial counterparts.
The GARCH(p,q)-M model is described by the following:
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n

rs ,t = α s ,k ∑ xs ,k + γ s ,0 hs ,t + ε s ,t

(1)

k =1

p

q

i =1

j =1

hs ,t = β s ,0 + β s ,i ∑ ε s2,t −i + γ s , j ∑ hs ,t − j

(2)

ε s ,t Ω s ,t −1 ~ N ( 0, hs ,t )

(3)

where the variables in the mean equation (1) are as follows: rs,t is the market return at time t
(where s = Rt, Rt-It and Rt-Yt), xs,k are the set of k political factors expected to influence rs,t
(where x = Ct, Lt, Tt and Et), hs,t measures the return volatility or risk of the market portfolio s
at time t, and εs,t is the error term which is normally distributed with zero mean and a variance
of hs,t, as described by the distribution in (3). The sensitivity of the market portfolio s at t to
the political factors is measured by the n parameters of αs,k.
The conditional variance hs,t follows the process described in (2) and for the sth market
portfolio is determined by the past squared error terms (ε2t-1) and past behaviour of the
variance (ht-1), βs,0 is the time-invariant component of risk for the sth market portfolio, βs, are
the ARCH parameter(s) and γs,j are the GARCH parameter(s). Heteroskedasticity consistent
covariance matrices are estimated following Bollerslev and Wooldridge.

5. Empirical results
The estimated coefficients and standard errors for the conditional mean return and variance
equations are presented in Table 2. Different GARCH-M(p,q) models were initially fitted to
the data and compared on the basis of the Akaike and Schwarz Information Criteria (results
not shown) from which a GARCH(1,1) model was deemed most appropriate for modelling
the monthly return process for the market returns. Nonetheless, this particular specification
has generally been shown to be a parsimonious representation of conditional variance that
adequately fits most financial time series.
The estimated coefficients and standard errors of the GARCH-M(1,1) parameters are
presented in Table 3. Nine separate models with three different independent variables across
three different sample periods are estimated: returns (columns 4, 5 and 6) (Rt), excess returns
over inflation (columns 7, 8 and 9) (Rt-It) and excess returns over interest rates (columns 10,
11 and 12) (Rt-Yt) and the full sample from January 1901 to December 2005 (uppermost
panel), another from January 1901 to December 1949 (middle panel) and a further from
January 1950 to December 2005 (lower panel). The breakpoint for splitting the sample is
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somewhat arbitrary, but does divide the sample into two fairly equal periods, and takes
allowance of the post-war shift from the Labor Party to the more than twenty year dominance
of the Liberal-Nationals. The independent variables for the nine models are common. The
independent variables are dummy variables for Liberal-National (Ct) and Labor (Lt)
governments, a political term trend (Tt), and dummy variables for election months (Et).
The political cycle hypotheses are tested as follows. As a rule, the market return for
Coalition governments is expected to be higher than the market return for Labor governments.
Moreover, it is hypothesised that returns vary within a given ministerial term, such that
returns may increase or decline during the term of office. Further, it is hypothesised that
returns in a month when an election is held may be higher or lower than returns during the
same political term, but the direction may be dependent upon whether the election comprises
a shock. Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003: 1863), for example, argued that “…if the observed
difference in returns is due to a difference in expected returns, the change in the level of the
market at the time that the information is revealed should be quite large”. Two hypotheses are
tested. The first is a test of the joint hypothesis that all four political parameters are significant
in influencing market returns (HN: α1 + α2 + α3 + α4 = 0; HA: α1 + α2 + α3 + α4 ≠ 0) the second
is that the estimated coefficient on Liberal (including the Nationals) is equal to the estimated
coefficient for the Labor Party (HN: α1 = α2; HA: α1 > α2). If the first null hypothesis is
rejected, then market returns exhibit a form of political cycle, related to either the party in
power and/or the tenure of power and/or election effects. If the second is rejected, then the
parties have a differential impact upon market returns.
All of the models in Table 3 are highly significant, with tests rejecting the null hypotheses
of joint insignificance of the four political cycle variables at the .01 level. The coefficient on
Liberal-National is always positive and higher than Labor, with the exception of returns and
excess returns over inflation for the period January 1950 to December 2005, and significant at
the .10 level or lower, with the exception of excess returns over interest in the period up to
December 1949. The coefficient on Labor is also mostly significant, with the exception of
excess returns over interest for the period 1901-2005, excess returns over inflation and excess
returns over interest up until 1949 and excess returns over interest since 1950. However, only
in the case of returns and excess returns over inflation for the entire sample period and for the
period until 1949 does a Wald test reject the null hypothesis of equality for the LiberalNational and Labor coefficients in favour of the alternative hypothesis that the coefficient for
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Liberal-National is greater than that for Labor. For the remaining coefficients, the coefficient
for the term in office is always negative, but never significant, while the coefficient for
election months is always positive and significant, indicating that returns are higher during
months in which an election is held. Finally, while the relationship between return and
volatility in models like this is far from clear empirically, in none of the models is the
variance term in the mean equation significantly negative.

6. Concluding remarks
The present study employs a number of different procedures to test for a political cycle in the
Australian stock market since Federation in January 1901. A comparison of mean returns
provides some evidence to support the conjecture that returns, excess returns over inflation
and excess returns over interest rates depend upon the political affiliation of the ministry in
power: more specifically, throughout Australian political history, market returns, however
defined, are generally higher under Liberal-National ministries than Labor ministries.
Moreover, there is strong evidence that the returns under Liberal-National ministries are more
normally distributed than returns under Labor ministries which are characterised by volatile,
extreme, and mostly negative, values. Such risk differences potentially arise from the
different parties’ economic and social policies, uncertainty among investors about these
policies, or doubt among voters concerning future election outcomes.
Modelling the political cycle using ARCH techniques is also suggestive of higher returns
under Liberal-National than Labor ministries. For returns and excess returns over inflation,
the returns for Liberal-National ministries are higher than Labor ministries for the full sample
and for the period before December 1949, however, the evidence concerning a premium for
Liberal-National ministries in terms of excess returns over interest rates is less significant.
This indicates that much of the difference between different political parties is tied up with
macroeconomic factors such as interest rates, and reflects opinion that political risk is mostly
reflected in these rather than stock returns. Moreover, the estimated coefficients for the Labor
party are higher in the period since 1950 (though not significantly), suggesting that any proor anti-bias by business and/or investors has lessened in more recent decades.
Of course, this study does suffer a number of limitations, all of which suggest future
avenues for research. First, it has not been possible to distinguish between small and large
caps in the Australian market. Hensel and Ziemba (1995), for example, identified that while
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the returns of large caps were identical under different administrations in the US, a significant
small cap effect existed under Democratic presidencies. Unfortunately, the use of a valueweighted index in the present analysis (and the unavailability of an equivalent equallyweighted index) infers the most direct focus is on large caps. Second, the monthly sampling
frequency employed in this study means that many interesting aspects of the political cycle
could not be full addressed. Though daily data is only available since January 1958, more
frequent sampling would nevertheless allow attention to be given to the information effects of
elections and election outcomes in the spirit of an event study [see, for instance, Santa-Clara
and Valkanov (2003)].
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Table 1 Australian ministries and monthly market returns, January 1901 to December 2005
No.

Ministry by Party or
prime minister coalition

Start
date

End
date

Term
Excess Excess
Ministry by Party or
in Return return return No.
prime minister coalition
office
inflation interest

Start
date

End
date

Term
Excess Excess
in Return return return
office
inflation interest

1 Barton
P
Jan 1901 Sep 1903
33 0.1648 0.1636
–
31 Menzies
L-CP
Jan 1956 Dec 1958
23 0.9110 0.9094 0.8277
–
2 Deakin
P
Sep 1903 Apr 1904
7 1.3060 1.3094
32 Menzies
L-CP
Dec 1958 Dec 1963
61 0.8166 0.8153 0.5531
–
3 Watson
ALP
Apr 1904 Aug 1904
4 1.1946 1.1991
33 Menzies
L-CP
Dec 1963 Jan 1966
25 -0.4123 -0.4148 -0.7389
–
4 Reid-McLean FT-P
Aug 1904 Jul 1905
10 0.5907 0.5901
34 Holt
L-CP
Jan 1966 Dec 1966
10 -0.3654 -0.3680 -0.7471
–
5 Deakin
P
Jul 1905 Nov 1908
40 0.6270 0.6253
35 Holt
L-CP
Dec 1966 Dec 1967
12 2.8128 2.8105 2.4395
–
36 McEwen
L-CP
Dec 1967 Jan 1968
1 1.0697 1.0667 0.6947
6 Fisher
ALP
Nov 1908 Jun 1909
7 0.4449 0.4435
–
7 Deakin
P-FT-TR Jun 1909 Apr 1910
11 0.6518 0.6512
37 Gorton
L-CP
Jan 1968 Feb 1968
2 1.2247 1.2241 0.8497
–
8 Fisher
ALP
Apr 1910 Jun 1913
38 0.2678 0.2636
38 Gorton
L-CP
Feb 1968 Nov 1969
20 1.2455 1.2426 0.8634
–
9 Cook
L
Jun 1913 Sep 1914
15 0.2017 0.1967
39 Gorton
L-CP
Nov 1969 Mar 1971
16 -1.1646 -1.1687 -1.6097
–
10 Fisher
ALP
Sep 1914 Oct 1915
13 0.0708 0.0580
40 McMahon
L-CP
Mar 1971 Dec 1972
21 1.0240 1.0191 0.6208
–
11 Hughes
ALP
Oct 1915 Nov 1916
12 -0.9614 -0.9590
41 Whitlam
ALP
Dec 1972 Dec 1972
1 0.1340 0.1305 -0.1868
–
42 Whitlam
ALP
Dec 1972 Jun 1974
17 -2.1957 -2.2062 -2.7069
12 Hughes
NL
Nov 1916 Feb 1917
4 -0.0764 -0.0743
–
13 Hughes
N
Feb 1917 Jan 1918
10 0.7861 0.7835
43 Whitlam
ALP
Jun 1974 Nov 1975
17 -0.1934 -0.2051 -0.9147
–
14 Hughes
N
Jan 1918 Feb 1923
61 0.7374 0.7343
44 Fraser
L-CP
Nov 1975 Dec 1975
2 4.7483 4.7294 4.1233
15 Bruce-Page
N-CP
Feb 1923 Oct 1929
81 0.5748 0.5739 -0.3064 45 Fraser
L-CP
Dec 1975 Dec 1977
24 0.3083 0.2989 -0.3599
16 Scullin
ALP
Oct 1929 Jan 1932
26 -1.4572 -1.4500 -1.8972 46 Fraser
L-CP
Dec 1977 Nov 1980
34 2.4109 2.4036 1.6484
17 Lyons
UAP
Jan 1932 Nov 1938
82 0.8421 0.8413 0.6512 47 Fraser
L-CP
Nov 1980 May 1982
18 -2.0766 -2.0848 -3.2398
18 Lyons
UAP
Nov 1938 Apr 1939
5 -0.6098 -0.6129 -0.7556 48 Fraser
L-CP
May 1982 Mar 1983
10 -0.0958 -0.1052 -1.2049
19 Page
CP-UAP Apr 1939 Apr 1939
1 -2.3546 -2.3542 -2.5004 49 Hawke
ALP
Mar 1983 Dec 1984
21 1.9400 1.9357 1.0421
20 Menzies
UAP
Apr 1939 Mar 1940
10 0.7158 0.7147 0.5700 50 Hawke
ALP
Dec 1984 Jul 1987
32 3.1143 3.1075 1.8613
21 Menzies
UAP
Mar 1940 Oct 1940
8 -0.6397 -0.6449 -0.7673 51 Hawke
ALP
Jul 1987 Apr 1990
32 -0.8725 -0.8787 -2.0415
22 Menzies
UAP
Oct 1940 Aug 1941
10 -0.0031 -0.0071 -0.1282 52 Hawke
ALP
Apr 1990 Dec 1991
21 0.3457 0.3426 -0.6141
23 Fadden
CP-UAP Aug 1941 Oct 1941
1 2.4532 2.4501 2.3282 53 Keating
ALP
Dec 1991 Dec 1991
1 -1.7532 -1.7532 -2.3782
24 Curtin
ALP
Oct 1941 Sep 1943
24 0.1583 0.1534 0.0333 54 Keating
ALP
Dec 1991 Mar 1993
14 0.1941 0.1932 -0.3048
25 Curtin
ALP
Sep 1943 Jul 1945
21 0.2633 0.2634 0.1620 55 Keating
ALP
Mar 1993 Mar 1996
35 0.9065 0.9040 0.3863
26 Forde
ALP
Jul 1945 Jul 1945
1 -0.1958 -0.1985 -0.2791 56 Howard
L-NPA Mar 1996 Oct 1998
32 0.4531 0.4524 -0.0158
27 Chifley
ALP
Jul 1945 Nov 1946
15 0.9726 0.9678 0.8893 57 Howard
L-NPA Oct 1998 Nov 2001
37 0.5766 0.5738 0.1459
28 Chifley
ALP
Nov 1946 Dec 1949
38 0.4341 0.4275 0.3551 58 Howard
L-NPA Nov 2001 Oct 2004
35 0.4128 0.4108 0.0045
29 Menzies
L-CP
Dec 1949 May 1951
16 2.0631 2.0518 2.0006 59 Howard
L-NS
Oct 2004 –
–
14 1.5575 1.5551 1.0985
30 Menzies
L-CP
May 1951 Jan 1956
68 -0.1591 -0.1649 -0.2382 All Various
Various Jan 1901 Dec 2005 1260 0.4931 0.4898 0.0615
Source: Australian Electoral Commission (2006a; 2006b). Notes: Return – monthly percentage return, Excess return over inflation – monthly excess percentage return over
monthly inflation, Excess return over interest – monthly excess percentage return over monthly 3-month T-bill yield (since 1928 only). Term in office is in months. The
Australian Parliament consists of two houses, the Senate – selected by voters within a state - and the House of Representatives – selected by voters within an electorate. The
party or coalition of parties that has a majority in the House of Representatives forms the Government. In most cases, new governments are formed after general elections, but
could also be formed if the majority party changes its leader, loses its majority (e.g. as a result of a by-election), or is defeated in an important vote. House of Representative
elections were held in Dec 1903, Dec 1906, Apr 1910, May 1913, Sep 1914, May 1917, Dec 1919, Jan 1922, Feb 1922, Nov 1925, Dec 1925, Nov 1928, Dec 1928, Oct 1929,
Dec 1929, Dec 1931, Sep 1934, Sep 1934, Oct 1937, Oct 1937, Sep 1940, Aug 1943, Sep 1946, Dec 1949, Apr 1951, May 1954, Dec 1955, Nov 1958, Dec 1961, Nov 1963,
Nov 1966, Oct 1969, Dec 1972, May 1974, Dec 1975, Dec 1977, Oct 1980, Mar 1983, Dec 1984, Jul 1987, Mar 1990, Mar 1993, Mar 1996, Oct 1998, Nov 2001 and Oct 2004.
Protectionist (P), Australian Labor Party (ALP), Free Trade (FT), Tariff Reform (TR), Nationalist Labour (NL), Nationalist (N), Country Party (CP), United Australia Party
(UAP), Liberal Party (L), National Party of Australia (NPA), Nationals (NS). The starting (ending) date for each ministry is to the nearest non-overlapping month, i.e. if the
previous ministry ended on 23 October (day-of-month not shown in table) that ministry ends in October and the following ministry starts in November.

Figure 1
Monthly market index and returns, January 1901 to December 2005
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Notes: Returns only. Sample period January 1901 to December 2005. Figures show the end-of-month value of the index
(left-hand side axis) and monthly returns (right-hand side axis).

Figure 2
Mean monthly returns by ministry, January 1901 to December 2005
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Table 2
Comparison of monthly returns by party and
coalition, January 1901 to December 2005

Number
Mean
Median
Maximum
Minimum
Std. Dev.
Skewness
Kurtosis
Jarque-Bera
Probability

All parties
and
coalitions
1258
0.4950
0.5632
20.1057
-55.2449
4.4896
-2.1009
29.5504
2.80E+04
0.0000

Number
Mean
Median
Maximum
Minimum
Std. Dev.
Skewness
Kurtosis
Jarque-Bera
Probability
Number
Mean
Median
Maximum
Minimum
Std. Dev.
Skewness
Kurtosis
Jarque-Bera
Probability

1258
0.4913
0.5622
20.1192
-55.2511
4.4897
-2.1015
29.5526
2.80E+04
0.0000
928
0.0615
0.2361
19.6161
-56.1932
4.5029
-2.2378
30.2093
2.95E+04
0.0000

Excess return (Rt-Yt)

Excess return (Rt-It)

Returns (Rt)

Statistic

Liberal- Australian
National Labor Party
(Ct)
(Lt)
869
389
0.5743
0.3121
0.6646
0.2550
16.7232
20.1057
-14.8877 -55.2449
3.2828
5.2298
-0.1200
-3.0428
6.7279
35.7443
5.06E+02 1.80E+04
0.0000
0.0000
869
0.5712
0.6653
16.7157
-14.8951
3.2830
-0.1212
6.7274
5.06E+02
0.0000
613
0.2075
0.3818
16.2999
-15.7577
3.7340
-0.2499
5.6153
1.81E+02
0.0000

389
0.3080
0.2469
20.1192
-55.2511
5.2300
-3.0432
35.7463
1.80E+04
0.0000
315
-0.2222
0.0593
19.6161
-56.1932
5.7046
-3.0274
32.0431
1.16E+04
0.0000

Notes: Liberal-National includes all antecedent parties.
Return – monthly percentage return, excess return over
inflation – monthly excess percentage return over
monthly inflation, excess return over interest – monthly
excess percentage return over monthly 3-month T-bill
yield (since 1928 only). Levene’s test of equality of
variances by category (Liberal-National and Australian
Labor Party) is rejected for returns (statistic = 25.27, pvalue = 0.00), excess returns over inflation (statistic =
25.30, p-value = 0.00) and excess returns over interest
(statistic = 13.54, p-value = 0.00). A t-test for equality of
means by category fails to be rejected for returns
(statistic = 1.09, p-value = 0.28), excess returns over
inflation (statistic = 1.08, p-value = 0.27) and excess
returns over interest (statistic = 1.37, p-value = 0.16).
The critical value for significance of at least 315
observations is 0.138 for skewness and 0.270 for
kurtosis.

Mean
equation
Test Variance
statistics equation
Mean
equation
Test Variance
statistics equation
Mean
equation
Test Variance
statistics equation

January 1950-December 2005

January 1901-December 1949

January 1901-December 2005

Table 3
Estimated coefficients and standard errors of political cycle models
Returns (Rt)
Excess returns over inflation (Rt-It) Excess returns over interest (Rt-Yt)
Parameter Coefficient Std. error p-value Coefficient Std. error p-value Coefficient Std. error p-value
γ
0.0042
0.0082
0.6148
0.0041
0.0082
0.6197
-0.0039
0.0092
0.6749
0.6130
0.1304
0.0000
0.6111
0.1304
0.0000
0.6143
0.1872
0.0010
α1
0.3592
0.1507
0.0172
0.3569
0.1508
0.0179
0.3578
0.2229
0.1084
α2
-0.0003
0.0034
0.9405
-0.0002
0.0034
0.9444
-0.0064
0.0044
0.1408
α3
0.4871
0.2923
0.0956
0.4865
0.2921
0.0958
0.9381
0.4350
0.0311
α4
0.1744
0.0626
0.0053
0.1745
0.0626
0.0053
0.3143
0.1170
0.0072
β0
0.2014
0.0310
0.0000
0.2016
0.0310
0.0000
0.2373
0.0407
0.0000
β1
γ
0.8148
0.0232
0.0000
0.8147
0.0232
0.0000
0.7864
0.0285
0.0000
–
–
–
ARCH-LM
1.0800
0.3719
1.0792
0.3727
0.5091
0.9080
–
–
–
α1+α2..= 0
52.4846
0.0000 52.4846
0.0000 17.7348
0.0014
–
–
–
α1 = α2
2.7735
0.0479
2.7803
0.0477
1.3701
0.1210
γ
-0.0044
0.0203
0.8267
-0.0044
0.0203
0.8273
0.0027
0.0134
0.8384
0.5758
0.1568
0.0002
0.5739
0.1568
0.0003
0.4060
0.2983
0.1736
α1
0.3215
0.1659
0.0526
0.3192
0.1660
0.0545
0.2095
0.1709
0.2202
α2
0.0013
0.0036
0.7107
0.0014
0.0036
0.7075
-0.0052
0.0051
0.2998
α3
0.0470
0.3163
0.8819
0.0462
0.3160
0.8838
0.6334
0.4622
0.1706
α4
0.3460
0.1366
0.0113
0.3457
0.1365
0.0113
0.1604
0.1127
0.1548
β0
0.2508
0.0627
0.0001
0.2504
0.0627
0.0001
0.5702
0.2091
0.0064
β1
γ
0.7295
0.0564
0.0000
0.7298
0.0564
0.0000
0.6461
0.0711
0.0000
–
–
–
ARCH-LM 14.6585
0.0000 14.5848
0.0000
7.8594
0.0000
–
–
–
α1+α2..= 0
24.5405
0.0000 24.3881
0.0000
5.1960
0.2678
–
–
–
α1 = α2
2.3806
0.0614
2.3893
0.0611
0.5000
0.2397
γ
-0.0042
0.0146
0.7743
-0.0042
0.0146
0.7714
-0.0097
0.0147
0.5087
0.8774
0.2964
0.0031
0.8748
0.2964
0.0032
0.5696
0.3004
0.0580
α1
1.1855
0.5047
0.0188
1.1831
0.5046
0.0190
0.5044
0.5084
0.3211
α2
-0.0064
0.0090
0.4744
-0.0064
0.0090
0.4759
-0.0032
0.0090
0.7173
α3
1.5772
0.9041
0.0811
1.5758
0.9044
0.0815
1.5959
0.9175
0.0820
α4
0.6328
0.2810
0.0243
0.6350
0.2818
0.0242
0.5440
0.2537
0.0320
β0
0.1471
0.0357
0.0000
0.1474
0.0358
0.0000
0.1271
0.0321
0.0001
β1
γ
0.8335
0.0334
0.0000
0.8332
0.0335
0.0000
0.8547
0.0313
0.0000
–
–
–
ARCH-LM
0.2988
0.9896
0.2988
0.9896
0.2806
0.9918
–
–
–
α1+α2..= 0
20.0769
0.0005 19.9977
0.0005 12.1594
0.0162
–
–
–
α1 = α2
-0.5981
0.2196
-0.5991
0.2195
0.0265
0.4353

Notes: Dependent variables are returns, excess returns over inflation and excess returns over interest. The GARCH-M models
presented include the conditional variance in the mean equation along with dummy variables for Liberal and Labor ministries, a
ministerial political cycle trend variable and a dummy variable for election months. The variance equation includes a constant, a
first-order autoregressive GARCH term and a first-order moving average ARCH term. ARCH test – Lagrange multiplier test of
null hypothesis of no ARCH errors versus the alternative hypothesis that the conditional error variance is given by an ARCH(12)
process from a preliminary least squares regression.

